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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1123 
__________ 
 
CYRUS R. SANDERS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
EMANUEL ROSE, Dauphin County Prison Officer; 
LT. HEWITT;  WARDEN DEROSE; 
DAUPHIN COUNTY PRISON; UNKNOWN OFFICERS; 
CRIEGHTON, Dauphin County Prison Officer; 
LT. CARNAZZO; MAJOR STEWART; 
UNKNOWN JOHN DOE PRISON GUARDS; 
UNKNOWN INTAKE COUNSELORS; 
CONNIE OROSZ; UNKNOWN MAILROOM AND LAW LIBRARY STAFF; 
FRANK J. LAVERY;  WILLIAM TULLY; 
DAUPHIN COUNTY PRISON BOARD; 
JEFFREY HASTE;  DAUPHIN COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; 
C.O. JOANN CRYDER; ROBERT THRONE; 
JILL CUFFARO 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-01241) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 15, 2019 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR, RESTREPO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 3, 2020) 
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___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Cyrus R. Sanders appeals from the District Court order that granted the 
Defendants’ summary judgment motion in his civil rights action.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will vacate the District Court’s order granting summary judgment, as well as 
its prior order granting Defendants’ motion to clarify claims remaining in the action, and 
we will remand for further proceedings.  
I. 
 Sanders filed his initial complaint in 2009 when he was a pretrial detainee at 
Dauphin County Prison.1  In October 2012, the District Court dismissed all counts of 
Sanders’ second amended complaint, except Count I (an access-to-courts claim), 
determining that Sanders had violated Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
by attempting to include unrelated counts in his complaint.  See Dkt. #63.  The Court 
later dismissed Count I for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  
See Dkt. #90.  On appeal, we affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of Count I but 
determined that there was no Rule 20 violation because all of the counts of the second 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 As we write for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and the procedural posture of 
this case, we address the facts and procedure only briefly. 
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amended complaint were related.  Sanders v. Rose, 576 F. App’x 91, 94-95 (3d Cir. 
2014) (per curiam, not precedential).  We affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded 
for consideration of claims in Sanders’ second amended complaint other than Count I.  
Id. at 95. 
After remand, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss.  The District Court 
granted the motion in part and denied it in part.  The order specifically stated, among 
other things, that “Defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED as to Plaintiff’s 
retaliation claim,” and “DENIED as to Plaintiff's claims of substantive and procedural 
due process violations resulting from the November 2, 2009 misconduct hearing.”  Dkt. 
#134.  The order also allowed Sanders’ excessive force and failure to intervene claims to 
go forward against certain defendants.  The Defendants then filed a motion for 
clarification regarding the order, expressing confusion about whether the excessive force 
and due process claims remained against certain defendants who had already been 
dismissed or who had not been served.  Dkt. #135.  The District Court issued an order 
and memorandum; the order stated, in full: 
In accordance with the accompanying memorandum, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
      1.  Defendants’ motion to clarify (Doc. No. 135) is 
GRANTED as set forth below. 
2. The only claims that remain in this action are (1) the excessive 
force and failure to intervene claims leveled against Defendants Rose, 
Cryder, Throne and the Unknown Officers, and (2) the procedural and 
substantive due process claims leveled against Defendants Hewitt and 
Cufarro.  All other claims are DISMISSED and all other Defendants 
terminated from this action. 
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Dkt. #140.  Notably, despite saying in the order granting the motion to dismiss in part 
(docketed at #134) that the retaliation claim was to continue, the order granting the 
motion for clarification (docketed at #140) does not mention a retaliation claim, nor does 
the accompanying memorandum opinion.   
After unsuccessful settlement discussions (Sanders was appointed counsel for the 
limited purpose of those discussions), the parties engaged in discovery and Defendants 
filed a summary judgment motion.  Sanders responded, but he did not file a statement of 
facts under Local Rule 56.1.  In a memorandum dated September 26, 2017, the District 
Court “accordingly deem[ed] the facts set forth by Defendants to be undisputed.  See 
Local Rule 56.1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).”  Memorandum Opinion, Dkt. #164, p. 5 n.1.  
The District Court granted summary judgment as to the excessive force, failure to 
intervene, and due process claims and directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in 
favor of Defendants Emanuel Rose, Joann Cryder, Throne, Lt. Hewitt, Jill Cuffaro, and 
the Unknown Officer.  Dkt. #165, 166.   
Sanders appealed.  After the parties filed their initial briefs, we directed the parties 
to file supplemental briefs, addressing whether the retaliation claim remained 
unadjudicated, and if the retaliation claim was dismissed or otherwise adjudicated 
without an explanation from the District Court, whether we should remand the action to 
the District Court. See Order entered April 9, 2019.  We also directed the parties to 
address whether the District Court properly applied Local Rule 56.1 to deem the 
Defendants’ facts as undisputed.  Id.   
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II. 
We first examine our jurisdiction.  The pivotal question regarding appellate 
jurisdiction is whether the District Court adjudicated all of Sanders’ claims.  “Generally, 
an order which terminates fewer than all claims pending in an action or claims against 
fewer than all the parties to an action does not constitute a ‘final’ order for purposes of 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.”  Elliott v. Archdiocese of New York, 682 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2012).  
Although the District Court did not discuss the retaliation claim in its order entered May 
17, 2016, in that order the court dismissed “all other claims” aside from certain specified 
claims; the retaliation claim was not one of the claims the district court listed as 
remaining in the action.  In its order entered September 26, 2017, the court granted 
summary judgment as to those claims that it had described as remaining in the action.  
We therefore conclude that these two orders adjudicated all claims in the action.   
The second jurisdictional issue is whether Sanders’ appeal was timely filed—his 
notice of appeal was filed well outside of the 30 days prescribed by Rule 4(a)(1)(A) of 
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.2  However, the District Court construed a 
document that Sanders filed as a motion to reopen the time to appeal under Rule 4(a)(6) 
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, granted his motion, and deemed his notice 
of appeal to be timely filed.  As Sanders satisfied the requirements of Rule 4(a)(6), we 
 
2 Sanders did not receive the District Court’s order granting summary judgment, as the 
Court mistakenly sent it to the attorney who had been appointed only for settlement 
discussions. 
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conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting Sanders’ motion 
to reopen the time to appeal.  See Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 453-54 (3d Cir. 
2012) (explaining requirements for reopening); United States v. Rinaldi, 447 F.3d 192, 
195 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that standard of review is abuse of discretion).3   
As the District Court adjudicated all of Sanders’ claims and Sanders’ appeal was 
timely filed, we have appellate jurisdiction. 
III. 
Appellees argue, in a rather circular manner, that there could be no viable 
retaliation claim because all of Sanders’ other constitutional claims were resolved by the 
District Court.  See, e.g., Appellees’ Supplemental Brief at 17 (“If the court considers the 
proper granting of Summary Judgment on [the other] claims, it is logical that the 
retaliation claims were clearly adjudicated or meant to be adjudicated without mention 
and thus included in the court’s Opinion and Order ultimately granting Summary 
Judgment in favor of the Defendants/Appellees.”).  However, Appellees fail to recognize 
that government actions, “which standing alone do not violate the Constitution, may 
nonetheless be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a desire to punish an 
individual for exercise of a constitutional right.”  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224–
 
3 Sanders filed in our Court a “Motion to Compel Arbitration Counsel Ganley’s 
Declaration,” asking us to compel the attorney to verify facts involved in the timeliness 
calculation.  As the District Court properly granted Sanders’ Rule 4(a)(6) motion, the 
motion to compel is denied as moot.  We also deny Appellees’ “Motion to Strike 
Plaintiff’s Untimely Notice of Appeal.”   
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25 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Appellees do not argue 
persuasively how the District Court’s adjudication of the other claims renders the 
retaliation claim moot or necessarily lacking in arguable merit.4 
To state a retaliation claim, Sanders was required to show:  “(1) constitutionally 
protected conduct, (2) an adverse action by prison officials ‘sufficient to deter a person of 
ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights,’ and (3) ‘a causal link 
between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against 
him.’”  Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 
F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)).  The burden then shifts to the prison officials to prove 
“that they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons 
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”  Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334.  Here, 
crediting Sanders’ allegations,5 Sanders likely established constitutionally protected 
 
4 Appellees also claim that Sanders has waived consideration of the retaliation claim by 
failing to raise it in his appellate brief.  But Sanders argued in his brief that the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment as to his “free speech” claim and argued that 
“a bogus misconduct was issued to rationalize the use of excessive force and a brutal 
beating upon the Appellant as a pretrial detainee who exercised his right of free speech.”  
Appellant’s Brief at 3.  Liberally construing his pro-se brief, as we must, see Haines v. 
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), we conclude that he did not waive the issue. 
 
5 See Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[I]n considering 
a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations 
or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party’s evidence is to 
be believed[,] and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
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conduct,6 the alleged beating would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising 
his First Amendment rights, and the allegation that the guards were singing the “Mickey 
Mouse” song establishes a nexus. 
In the context of summary judgment, Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure indicates that a court “should state on the record the reasons for granting or 
denying” a motion for summary judgment.  And before Rule 56 was amended to include 
that requirement, we determined that having a district court’s explanation for a summary 
judgment grant was so important that we exercised our “supervisory power to require the 
district courts in this circuit to accompany grants of summary judgment hereafter with an 
explanation sufficient to permit the parties and this court to understand the legal premise 
for the court’s order.”  Vadino v. A. Valey Engineers, 903 F.2d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 1990).7  
 
6 Inmates retain the “protections afforded by the First Amendment,” O’Lone v. Estate of 
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987), but they “retain[] [only] those First Amendment 
rights that are not inconsistent with [their] status as [] prisoner[s] or with the legitimate 
penological objectives of the corrections system,” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 
(1974).  Because the District Court did not adjudicate the retaliation claim, it did not 
discuss whether Sanders, a pretrial detainee, had a First Amendment right to express his 
displeasure with the prison’s system for access to legal materials.  
   
7 We noted that “[t]here are, of course, cases where the reason for summary judgment is 
apparent on the record because, for example, only one ground was given for the motion.”  
Id. at 258.  But here, the District Court explicitly rejected the only reasons the Defendants 
gave for dismissal of the retaliation claim, see Memorandum, Dkt. #133 at 13 (“without 
further development of the record the court cannot say there is no viable First 
Amendment claim”), and the Defendants’ memorandum in support of their motion for 
summary judgment does not expressly address the retaliation claim.  Although the 
Defendants argue in their brief in support of their motion for summary judgment that “all 
remaining Defendants” are “entitled to qualified immunity such that Plaintiff’s remaining 
claims must be dismissed,” Brief, Dkt. #159 at 2, both the Defendants and the District 
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Given the District Court’s failure to mention the retaliation claim in orders subsequent to 
the order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the retaliation claim, we cannot 
discern the District Court’s reasons for dismissing or granting summary judgment as to 
the retaliation claim. 
IV. 
The parties were also directed to address whether the District Court properly 
applied Local Rule 56.1 to deem the Defendants’ facts as undisputed.  See Weitzner v. 
Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 2018) (determining that a district court’s 
application and interpretation of its own local rules should be reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, but reiterating that the court still was required to do a “full analysis” to 
determine whether summary judgment was appropriate); Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 
203, 209 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that “sworn deposition testimony--which the District 
court did not consider” in a pro se case established a genuine issue of material fact).   
We need not address any procedural issues that arose in connection with the 
disposition of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  Because the facts underlying 
Sanders’ retaliation claim are interrelated with the facts underlying the claims that the 
District Court considered on summary judgment (excessive force and failure-to-intervene 
claims against Defendants Rose, Cryder, Throne, and Unknown Officers, and the 
procedural and substantive due process claims against Defendants Hewitt and Cuffaro), 
 
Court discuss qualified immunity as to the excessive force claim and not with regard to 
the retaliation claim, see Id. at 508; Memorandum, Dkt. #164, at 17-19. 
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we will vacate the order granting summary judgment in its entirety.  On remand, the 
District Court shall direct the Defendants to file a motion for summary judgment that 
addresses all of the claims that survived Defendants’ motion to dismiss, which we have 
determined includes Sanders’ retaliation claim, unless they wish to proceed to trial as to 
any claim. 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s orders entered on 
May 17, 2016, and September 26, 2017, and will remand this matter for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
